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IN THE 
SUPREME COURT 
OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
Perry E. Burnham and Bertha H. 
Burnham, his wife, and L. Earl 
Burnham and Gladys H. Burnham, 
his wife, 
Plaintiffs and Appellants, 
vs. 
Albert E. Reid and Leah Reid, his 
wife, Clifton B. Layton and Jack 
B. Layton, 
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No. 7993 
BRIEF FOR RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
As all of the facts affecting this matter have not 
been set out in the brief of appellants, the respondent 
is compelled to make some repetition in the following 
statement. 
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On the 22nd day of November, 1946, an agreement 
was entered into by and between Cove Ranch Land 
and Livestock Company, a corporation as party of the 
first part, the Chipman Investment Company, a corp-
oration, party of the second part, William Chipman, 
Alfonzo Chipman, Mae C. Cozzens and Royal Murdock, 
Executors and Trustees of the will and Estate of James 
Chipman, deceased, parties of the third part, and Clifton 
B. Layton, party of the fourth part, wherein the said 
Clifton B. Layton, party of the fourth part, purchased 
from the said parties of the first, second and third 
parts certain real property and personal property known 
as the Cove Ranch in Blaine County, State of Idaho for 
the sum of $70,000.00 Said ranch consisted of 3,113.91 
acres of land, all water and water rights of every na-
ture and description appurtenant to said land and all 
improvements located thereon, and all shares of water 
in the By-Pass Water Association of Hailey, Idaho and 
the United States Taylor Grazing permits as described 
in said agreement, and also the Saw Tooth Association 
Grazing Stock consisting of 10 shares. 
The purchase price of $70,000.00 was to be paid 
as follows: $20,000.00 cash on or before the 1st day of 
J{anuary, 1947; $50,000.00 cash, together with 5 per cent 
interest per annum from August 1, 1946, within one year 
from January 21, 1947. 
On July 29, 1946 which is prior to the date of the 
aforementioned agreement, a certain agreement en-
titled "Option to Purchase" by and between Ray Rose-
braugh and A. E. Christensen as agents for the said First, 
Second and Third Parties in the above referred to agree· 
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ment and Clifton B. Layton for himself had been en-
tered into to effect the said purchase and sale. 
That on the 22nd day of November, 1946, the same 
date as the execution of the agreement for the pur-
chase of the ranch, Clifton B. Layton and Lois Layton, 
his wife, made, executed and delivered to A. Edsel 
Christensen and Ray Rosebraugh, their certain promis-
sory note in writing in the sum of $10,000.00 and to 
secure the payment of said promissory note, also made, 
executed and delivered to A. Edsel Christensen and Ray 
Rosebraugh a certain mortgage on the real property 
known as the Cove Ranch, that said mortgage was re-
corded in the office of the County Recorder of Blaine 
County, Idaho in Book 155 of Mortgages, page 129. The 
note and the mortgage were intended to evidence an 
obligation on the part of the said Clifton B. Layton 
to pay compensation to the said A. Edsel Christensen 
and Ray Rosebraugh for the sale of the real estate as 
agents under the "Option to Purchase" above referred to. 
To more fully explain this mortgage I refer to the 
Findings of Fact entered in the foreclosure suit by 
Judge D. H. Sutphen under date of October 17, 1949. 
(Tr. 45) 
'_'At the time of the execution of said mortgage, 
the Interest of the said Clifton Layton and Lois 
Layton in said property was that of a purchaser 
thereof evidenced by a written agreement executed 
and delivered on the 22 day of November 1946 
' ' between the Cove Ranch Land & Livestock Com-
pany and others as vendors and the defendant 
Clifton B. Layton as purchaser, wherein the said 
Clifton B. Layton contracted to purchase said prop-
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erty from said vendors and at said time said con-
tract was in good standing and the said Clifton B. 
Layton and Lois Layton were in actual possession 
of said land. That at said time the said Clifton B. 
Layton and Lois Layton intended and had agreed 
to place a first mortgage on said land to pay the 
balance unpaid to the vendors in said agreement as 
is evidenced by a supplementary agreement to 
second mortgage, a copy of which marked Exhibit 
C is attached to the amended supplemental com-
plaint and also attached to said mortgage in the 
case as an exhibit. That it was by reason of such 
supplementary agreement that said mortgage was 
designated a second mortgage. That the terms of 
said supplementary agreement to said second mort-
gage were, however, never carried out and the de-
fendants Clifton B. Layton and Lois Layton did 
not execute the intended first mortgage on said 
premises.'' 
At the instance and request of the Laytons, Perry 
E. Burnham advanced to the said Clifton B. Layton, as 
a temporary loan, the sum of $10,000.00 with which to 
make the first payment on said contract and thereafter 
advanced the additional sum of $7,000.00 with which 
to make the second payment thereon and advanced 
further sums of money from time to time in payment 
of taxes and other expenses; that approximately $8,000.00 
was paid on account of the purchase price by the sale 
and exchange of lands and on January 21, 1948, there 
remained unpaid the sum of $46,500.00. That the said 
Perry E. Burnham and L. Earl Burnham at the request 
of Layton, paid to the vendors this sum and in order to 
secure the repayment of the moneys owed by the Lay-
tons to the Burnhams, title to said Cove Ranch proper-
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ties and to personal property located thereon, including 
livestock and machinery belonging to the Laytons, was 
placed in _the names of the Burnhams as security hold-
ers, and not otherwise. The Laytons, however, con-
tinued in possession of said ranch properties and man-
aged and operated the same. (Tr. 138) 
On November 7, 1947, the said Clifton B. Layton 
executed and delivered to Jack Layton, his son, an 
assignment of his interest in said contract of purchase 
and the assignment was duly filed for record and re-
corded in the office of the County Recorder of Blaine 
County, Idaho in Book 149, page 233. 
Thereafter, in May 1948, the Burnhams and Lay-
tons negotiated the sale of the Cove Ranch properties, 
including livestock and equipment situated thereon, 
to Carl H. Randall, Edward Randall and Oriel Randall, 
for a total purchase price of $140,000.00 The said Ran-
dalls entered into a written contract for the purchase 
of said "Cove Ranch" and personal property, from the 
said Perry E. Burnham and L. Earl Burnham, for said 
amount. Said contract was entered into by the said 
Burnhams as trustees for the Laytons and on their own 
behalf for the purpose of obtaining a repayment of all 
moneys due and owing Burnhams by the Laytons, in con-
nection with the loans and advances made by them. 
At the time of the execution of said contract referred 
to with the said Randalls, the Burnhams accepted from 
the said Carl H. Randall, Edward Randall and Oriel 
Randall three promissory notes, each in the principal 
amount of $25,000.00 to be secured by mortgages on 
certain real property, which said notes and the mort-
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gages thereafter delivered were taken as a cash item 
in full payment of all obligations therefore and then 
owing by the Laytons to the Burnhams. (Tr. 138). 
Thereafter the Burnhams treated said notes and mort-
gages as their own personal property received as par-
tial payment thereon cattle of the value of $25,000.00, 
$12,762.46 in cash from sale of crops produced in 1948 
and upon their own initiative and without authority 
from the Laytons, compromised and settled the balance 
of said obligations prior to the time the same became 
due. 
Notwithstanding the cancellation of the indebted-
ness owing by Laytons to the Burnhams by the accept-
ance of the notes and mortgages referred to in the pre-
ceding paragraph, the Burnhams thereafter exercised 
control over said Cove Ranch to the exclusion of the 
Laytons. However, Burnhams' right to the said property 
ceased at the time of the execution of said contract of sale 
with the Randalls. In connection with subsequent trans-
actions, the Burnhams received from said ranch proper-
ties various sums of money which belonged to the Lay-
tons, to-wit: 
August 6, 1948-from sale of horses in 1948 $ 266.60 
April 6, 1949-James A. Baird (down payment on 
purchase of ranch) 5,000.00 
October 31,' 1949-From sale of crops produced 
in 1949. 3,874.86 
September 12, 1950-From Albert E. Reid and 
others on final sale. 81,085.74 
Total $89,277.20 
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On the 24th day of January, 1947, the said A. E. 
Christensen and Ray Rosebraugh instituted suit for 
judgment upon the said note from the said Clifton 
B. Layton and to foreclose the mortgage given to se-
cure the said promissory note. After the institution of 
said suit, the said A. E. Christensen and Ray Rosebraugh 
assigned and transferred said note and mortgage to one, 
Walter Stewart and the said Walter Stewart filed an 
Amended and Supplemental Complaint for judgment 
upon said note and for the fore~losure of the mortgage 
and made the appellants in this action as well as Clifton 
B. Layton and his wife and Jack B. Layton and his wife, 
parties defendant to the suit. 
Answers were made by the appellants herein to 
said Amended Complaint and by Clifton B. Layton 
and Jack Layton, the assignee of the interest of the 
said Clifton B. Layton. (Tr. 32-43) 
On April 15, 1948 a purported notice of cancellation 
of agreement was executed by Perry E. Burnham and 
L. Earl Burnham addressed to Clifton B. Layton and 
his wife, Jack Layton and his wife, A. Edsel Christensen 
and Ray W. Rosebraugh purporting to cancel the agree-
ment theretofore existing between Cove Ranch Land 
and Livestock Company, a corporation et al and the 
said Clifton B. Layton. 
A trial of the issues made by the pleadings in the 
foreclosure suit was had in the District Court for Blaine 
County, Idaho and said Court made findings, drew con-
clusions and entered its Judgment and Decree in said 
matter. (Tr. 44-56) 
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The court found that "At the time of the execution 
of said mortgage the interest of the said Clifton Layton 
and Lois Layton in said property was that of a pur-
chaser thereof." 
"That the said Burnhams did not give the plaintiff 
in the foreclosure action or the said Christensen and 
Rosebraugh or any of them an opportunity to pay the 
balance unpaid on said contract of November 22, 1945, 
and did not give any of such persons advance notice 
of their intention to forfeit said contract and did not at 
any time tender to Christensen and Rosebraugh or the 
plaintiff or any of them a deed to the property described 
in said agreement of November 22, 1946, or any part or 
portion thereof." (Tr. 47) 
The Honorable Judge of the District Court of the 
United States, for the District of Utah (Central Divi-
sion) in his Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law 
in the suit for accounting brought by the Laytons vs. 
Burnhams makes the following finding: 
"The Plaintiff (Laytons) have at no time by an 
agreement with the Defendants (Burnhams) or 
otherwise, altered the fundamental security rela-
tionship which originally existed between the par-
ties except that Plaintiffs, (Laytons) authorized 
the Defendants (Burnhams) to receive from the 
Randall Brothers $75,000.00 in notes and mortgages 
as a cash item in payment of all obligations there-
tofore and then owing by Plaintiffs to Defendants, 
which agreement was fulfilled." (Tr. 140-141) 
The Decree of Foreclosure gave judgment to Walter 
Stewart the plaintiff herein for the sum of $10,000.00 
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and interest, attorneys' fees and costs decreed the judg-
ment as a lien on the Cove Ranch property, which said 
lien was subject only to a prior claim in favor of Perry 
E. Burnham, etc. (Tr. 54-55) 
Thereafter the District Court for Blaine County, 
Idaho, issued an order for the sale of the said Cove Ranch 
property pursuant to the Judgment and pursuant to 
said Order, said property was sold by Sheriff of Blaine 
County, Idaho at which sale the appellants, Perry E. 
Burnham and L. Earl Burnham became the purchasers 
and the said Sheriff issued to them a certificate of sale of 
said property. The certificate of sale being dated June 
9, 1950. (Tr. 59-61) 
The defendants Clifton B. Layton, Jack B. Layton 
and Grace Layton filed their motion for an Order fix-
ing and determining the amounts necessary for re-
demption and pursuant to the said motion an Order was 
entered by the Court fixing the amount of redemption 
in the sum of $80,542.90 with 6 per cent interest. (Tr. 
63) 
The Order of Sale signed by D. H. Sutphen, Judge, 
on May 3', 1950, reads as follows: "That the property 
therein described be sold by the Sheriff of Blaine 
County, "Idaho, in one parcel and in the manner pro-
vided by law and the practice of this Court, subject to 
the statutory right of redemption which may exist in 
favor of the defendants or either of them." (Tr. 58) 
The respondents, Albert E. Reid and Leah Reid, his 
wife, are assignees of the rights of redemption claimed 
by Clifton B. Layton, Jack Layton and also hold Quit 
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Claims Deeds from the said Clifton B. Layton, Jack 
Layton and his wife of the property known as the Cove 
Ranch property. 
On September 11, 1950 the respondents, Albert E. 
Reid and Leah Reid, his wife, paid to the appellants 
the sum of $81,085.74 with an additional 6 per cent per 
annum interest on $80,542.90 from September 9, 1950, 
which said sum included reinbursement to the appell-
ants of the full amount of redemption fixed by the 
Court by the Order and also included reimbursement 
to the appellants for all water assessments, including 
water assessments paid by the appellants for the year 
1950, and also included reimbursement for all taxes 
paid plus interest and reimbursement for the taxes of 
$2,514.75 for the years 1948 and 1949 plus interest 
thereon. Therefore the appellants were made whole for 
every expenditure made by them and also received 
$81,085.74 to which they were not entitled according to 
the Findings of Fac.h under the accounting action in the 
District Court of the United States, for the District of 
Utah. (Tr. 139) 
Prior to making redemption as aforesaid, to-wit: 
on September 6, 1950 the appellants herein and the 
respondents Albert E. Reid and Leah Reid entered into 
a contract in writing in which among other things, it 
was agreed: 
" ( 1) That of the landlord's share of the crop 
upon the land being redeemed and which has been 
raised and will be harvested as, of and during the 
crop year of 1950 and being one-third of such 
landlord's share shall be paid over to first parties, 
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the defendants herein (the Reids) free and clear of 
all claims by second parties; the remaining two 
thirds of such landlord's share of the 1950 crop 
shall be sold as the same is harvested and the pro-
ceeds placed in escrow with the Zion's Savings 
Bank and Trust Company of Salt Lake City, Utah, 
there to be held in escrow until declaratory judg-
ment of other agreeable determination can be had 
as to the rights of first and second parties thereto; 
costs of the said escrow and of determination of 
the claims of the parties to the said two-thirds 
of the landlord's share of the 1950 crop to be appor-
tioned to the parties and borne by them in the par-
portion that the parties may finally be determined 
to be entitled to the said crop; provided however, 
that it is agreed that between first and second 
parties two-thirds of all grain and one-half of all 
hay of the entire 1950 crop from the said Cove 
Ranch shall be considered the property of the 1950 
tenants, Nek Stelma and family and provided fur-
ther that the entire landlord's share of the crop 
from one hundred sixty acres of land upon the 
said Cove Ranch and described more particularly 
as: 
The Northwest quarter of the Northwest quarter 
and a fraction of the Northeast quarter of the North-
west quarter; Tax Lot 146, ·.Section 20, Township 
1 North, Range 19 East, Boise Meridian. 
Also, the North half of the Northwest quarter 
of Section 34, Township 1 North, Range 19 East, 
Boise Meridian, shall be the property of second 
parties free and clear from any claim of first par-
ties and provided that in the event second parties 
ultimately receive the said two-third share of the 
crop, they will pay the full cost of alfalfa seed for 
the year 1950." 
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At the time of the sale of said property under 
the said judgment, one Nek Stelma was in possession of 
said property as a tenant upon a share crop basis under 
the terms of which one-third of all wheat grown upon 
the said property and one-half of the hay was to go to 
the lan~lord. At the time of the execution of the agree-
ment hereinabove referred to between the appellants 
and the respondent, the wheat on the said property was 
either harvested or was matured and was being har-
vested and the hay was in stacks. Wheat was sold and 
one third of the landlord's share of the proceeds of the 
sale amounting to $3,129.08 was paid to the respondents, 
and two-thirds of the landlord's share of said wheat sales 
was deposited in escrow with Zion's Savings Bank and 
Trust Company, Salt Lake City, Utah to await the de-
termination of the ownership of the said money amount-
ing to $6,258.05. 
The ownership of the 160 acres referred to in the 
agreement dated September 6, 1950 by and between the 
appellants and the respondents, is in dispute. The Find-
ings of Fact of the District Court of the United States, 
for the District of Utah is to the effect that the appel-
lants hold said 160 acres in trust for the Laytons, to-
gether with all water rights in connection therewith 
and that said property should be delivered by the Burn-
hams to the Laytons by appropriate instruments of tran-
fers. (Tr. 140) 
Eighty acres of the 160 acres was received in a trade 
for a portion of the original tract covered by the original 
agreement of November 22, 1946 between Cove Ranch 
Land and Livestock Company, a corporation at al as 
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Sellers and Clifton B. Layton, as Buyer and the other 
80 acres has always been a part of the Cove Ranch 
property. For some unexplainable reason this 80 acre 
tract was not described under the mortgage given 
by Layton to Rosebraugh and Christensen and therefore 
the 160 acres in question was not covered under the fore-
closure of the mortgage and was not described in the 
redemption certificate. The 160 acres, however, are 
contiguous to the Cove Ranch and have always been 
farmed with the remainder of'-the Cove Ranch property. 
During the 1951 season, 80 acres was leased by the re-
spondents to R. D. Hess who had full possession of the 
same, planted, cultivated and harvested the. crops grown 
on said tract and received the money for the sale of 
said crop. The other 80 acres was leased by the re-
spondents with the balance of Cove Ranch to Nek 
Stelma .. for the year 1951. The appellants in an 
amendment and supplement to their complaint prayed 
also for a declaratory judgment adjudging them to be 
owners and entitled to the wheat grown on the 160 
acres during the year 1951. 
The court concluded that the appellants were en-
titled to $2,340.51 and the respondents Albert E. Reid 
and Leah Reid were entitled to $3,917.54 of the es-
crowed funds with Zion's Savings Bank and Trust Com-
pany and further: 
"That the court cannot terminate the controversy of 
the matter referred to in the supplemental to the Com-
plaint and denied the motion for a declaratory judg-
ment in reference to the facts set forth in the supple-
mental to the complaint." 
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POINTS ARGUED BY RESPONDENTS 
1. Full payment was made to appellants from other 
sources and therefore appellants are not entitled to any 
of the escrowed funds. 
2. Upon redemption from the foreclosure of the 
mortgage the original rights of the Laytons which had 
been assigned to respondents Albert E. Reid and Leah 
Reid were restored freed of the lien for which the prop-
erty was sold and as the indebtedness to the appellants 
had been completely discharged, the respondents are en-
titled to all title, right and interest in the property in-
cluding the right in full to the landlord's share of the 
crops. 
3. Laytons had the right to redemption and had as-
signed said right to respondents, Albert E. Reid and Leah 
Reid, his wife. 
4. The purported notice of cancellation was of no 
effect. 
5. Respondents Albert E. Reid and Leah Reid, his 
wife, were restored to the position of Clifton B. Layton 
at the time of the execution of his note and mortgage in 
favor of Rosebraugh and Christensen, with the indebted-
ness to the appellants paid in full and the Sellers under 
the contract paid in full and therefore respondents are 
entitled to the whole of said property and all benefits 
therefrom. 
6. The action as filed was to obtain a declaratory 
judgment as to the ownership of the escrowed funds with 
Zion's Savings Bank and Trust Company and other 
matters extrinsic to the issues should not be introduced. 
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7. If the case is considered only as the ordinary fore-
closure of mortgages, the appellants would be entitled 
only to the landlord's share of the crop for the period of 
time while they held the certificate of sale, that is from 
June 9, 1950 to September 11, 1950, the date that the 
respondents made payment and made redemption of the 
property. 
8. As a dispute exists between the parties as to the 
ownership of the 160 acres of land upon which a 1951 
crop was raised, as it involves the question of title to 
real property in the State of Idaho, this Court has no 
jurisdiction of the question raised in the supplemental to 
the complaint. 
ARGUMENT 
Point 1 
FULL PAYMENT WAS MADE TO APPELLANTS 
FROM OTHER SOURCES AND THEREFORE APPEL-
LANTS ARE NOT ENTITLED TO ANY OF THE ES-
CROWED FUNDS. 
Subsequent to the Sheriff's Sale on June 2, 1950, 
the District Court for Blaine County, Idaho through D. 
H. Sutphen, Judge, pursuant to the motion of Clifton B. 
Layton, Jack B. Layton and Grace Layton made an Order 
fixing the amount required for the redemption of the 
property from the sale to the Burnhams as follows: 
Purchase price at Sheriff's Sale --------------------$71,451.06 
Interest at 6% from June 2, 1950 ________________ 563.77 
Taxes paid August 9, 1948 ------------------------ 3,061.89 
Interest at 6% from August 9, 1948____________ 357.39 
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Taxes paid June 6, 1950 ------------------------------
Add interest at 6% from June 2, 1950 _______ _ 
Water assessments paid April 20, 1950 _______ _ 
Add interest at 6% from April 20, 1950 _______ _ 
Water assessments paid April 1, 1950 _________ ~ 
Interest at 6% from April 1, 1950 ----------------
Sawtooth grazing stock assessment paid 
June 6, 1950 --------------------~---------------------------
Interest at 6% from June 6, 1950 _______________ _ 
Water assessment paid May 15, 1948 ___________ _ 
Interest at 6% from May 15, 1948 ----------------
2,514.75 
19.83 
1,634.22 
24.43 
293.22 
5.33 
50.00 
.36 
500.00 
66.65 
TOTAL _________________ ---------------------------~.:_------ .. $80 .542.90 
This was the amount set to redeem as of September 
9, 1950. (Tr. 6) The respondents Albert E. Reid and Leah 
Reid on September 11, 1950 paid to the appellants the 
sum of $81,085.74 which was the amount determined plus 
6% interest from September 9, 1950 to September 11, 
1950. 
Thus the appellants were made completely whole 
for every dollar which they had advanced including mon-
eys paid for taxes and water assessments, including the 
water assessments used in the raising of the crops for 
the year 1950. 
The appellants in connection with the purchase of 
the Cove Ranch had loaned to Clifton B. Layton the pur-
chaser the sum of $63,102.25 and the said Clifton B. Lay-
ton had purchased from or through one of the appellants, 
Perry E. Burnham, certain cattle for which the said 
Clifton B. Layton became obligated to pay the sum of 
$5.656.00 (Tr. 138) This indebtedness had been com-
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pletely discharged by the appellants taking the three 
promissory notes of Carl H. Randall, Edward Randall and 
Oriel Randall, each in the principal amount of $25,000.00 
to be secured by mortgages on certain real property, 
which said notes and the mortgages thereafter de-
livered were taken as a cash item in full payment of all 
obligations theretofore and then owing by the said Lay-
ton to the said appellants. (Tr. 138) Notwithstanding the 
cancellation of the indebtedness owing by the said Lay-
ton to the appellants, the appellants also received from 
said ranch properties various other sums and then took 
the $81,085.74 from the respondents, which in fact be-
longed to the Laytons. (Tr. 139) 
Obviously, therefore, the appellants are in no way 
entitled to any portion of the escrowed funds. 
Point 2. 
UPON REDEMPTION FROM THE FORECLOS-
URE OF THE MORTGAGE, THE ORIGINAL RIGHTS 
OF THE LAYTONS WHICH HAD BEEN ASSIGNED 
TO RESPONDENTS ALBERT E. REID AND LEAH 
REID WERE RESTORED FREED OF THE LIEN FOR 
WHICH THE PROPERTY WAS SOLD AND AS THE 
INDEBTEDNESS TO THE APPELLANTS HAD BEEN 
COMPLETELY DISCHARGED, THE RESPONDENTS 
ARE ENTITLE TO ALL TITLE, RIGHT AND INTER-
EST IN THE PROPERTY INCLUDING THE RIGHT 
IN FULL TO THE LANDLORD'S SHARE OF THE 
CROPS. 
In Evans vs. City of American Falls, 11 Pac. 2nd, 
page 363, citing Idaho C. S. Sec. 6933. 
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"The judgment debtor redemptioner may re-
deem the property. from the purchaser within one 
year after the sale on paying the purchaser the 
amount of his purchase with 10 per cent thereon in 
addition, together with the amount of any assess-
ment or taxes which the purchaser may have paid 
thereon after the purchase and interest on such 
amount; and if the purchaser be also a creditor hav-
ing a prior lien to that of the redemptioner, other 
than the judgment under which such purchase was 
made, the amount of such lien with interest." 
In this case the appellant having acquired title prior 
to the expiration of the period of redemption by making 
redemption from the original sale, took the land free and 
clear from the lien of the original judgment, under 
which it had been sold. (See Evans vs. Humphrey, 51 
Idaho-5 P 2nd 545) 
The language in the Evans case on this point is: 
"The title so arising from the redemption was not a 
new title. It was merely the original title of the judg-
ment debtor restored of the lien from which the prop-
erty was sold." 
That exact question has been passed upon by the 
Court of Appeals of California in construing a statute 
identical with Idaho C. S. Sec. 6933 and from which it 
was adopted: 
"In case of redemption by the judgment debtor 
or mortgagor, the effect of the sale is extinguished 
and the statute declares he is restored to his estate 
in the land, which then, for the first time, becomes 
subject to the lien of the unsatisfied portion of the 
judgment. The lien attaches then because the effect 
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of the sale has been extinguished and the mortgagor 
or judgment debtor is the owner of the estate as 
though no sale had been made.'' 
Applying the said statute and the above theory to 
the case before the Court. 
The title arising from the redemption was not a new 
title, it was the original title of the judgment debtor re-
stored freed of the lien for which the property was sold. 
The mortgagor or judgment debtor or his assignee or 
grantee is the owner of the estate as though no sale had 
been made. 
The respondents Albert E. Reid and Leah Reid there-
fore step into the shoes of the mortgagor and must be 
recognized as purchasers under the contract of purchase 
and thus have the right to complete the contract of 
purchase which they do in paying the appellants in full 
all that is owing to them, and the respondents are then 
entitled to receive all title, right and interest in the 
property purchased under the contract including all 
the right or interest of the appellants in the landlord's 
share of the crop. 
Judge Sutphen, the trial judge, recognized this fact 
and made an attempt to adjust all equities involved. 
This is specifically shown by the Decree of Fore-
closure entered by Judge Sutphen wherein he enters 
judgment on the $10,000 note secured by the mortgage 
executed by Clifton B. Layton with interest, costs and 
attorneys' fees and makes the judgment a lien on the 
property described in said mortgage and goes on to say: 
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"Which said lien is subject only to a prior claim 
in favor of the defendant Perry E. Burnhan1 in 
the sum of $17,000.00 together with interest on 
$10,000.00 thereof with interest computed at 5 per 
cent per annum from December 7, 1946 together with 
interest on $7,000.00 thereof from January 15, 1947 
at 5 per cent per annum and subject to a prior 
claim in favor of the defendants Perry E. Burnham, 
and L. Earl Burnham, jointly in the sum of $46,104.35 
with interest on said latter sum from February 18, 
1948 at 5 per cent per annum." (Tr. 54) 
You will note that the $10,000.00 note in favor of 
Christensen and Rosebraugh which was secured by the 
mortgage which was the subject of the foreclosure ·was 
dated January 23', 1947 and you will also note that the 
advancement of the sum of $46,104.35 made by the 
Burnhams was not until February 18, 1948 more than 
a year later, and therefore Judge Sutphen was attempt-
ing to adjust all equities in his adjudication of the case. 
Point 3. 
LAYTONS HAD THE RIGHT TO REDEMPTION 
AND HAD ASSIGNED SAID RIGHT TO RESPOND-
ENTS, ALBERT E. REID AND LEAH REID, HIS WIFE. 
There is no question that Judge Sutphen recog-
nized that the Laytons had the right of redemption as 
well as the other defendants. I refer to his letter under 
date of December 2, 1949 (Tr. 51) whrein he states: 
"As I understand the law, the respective parties 
will each have their statutory rede1nption rights 
which this Court cannot modify.'' 
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May it also be called to the Court's attention that 
in the Certificate of Redemption which was delivered by 
the appellants herein to the respondents upon payment 
of the $81,085.74, the appellants made the following 
statement: 
"That said redemption was made by the said 
Albert E. Reid and Leah Reid, his wife, upon the 
following claim of right: 
By virtue of assignments of all the rights of 
Clifton B. Layton, Jack B. Layton and Mrs. Jack 
B. Layton, his wife, by Quit Claim Deeds to Albert 
E. Reid and Leah Reid, his wife, now of record in 
the office of the County Recorder of Blaine County, 
State of Idaho." 
Point 4. 
THE PURPORTED NOTICE OF CANCELLATION 
WAS OF NO EFFECT 
If the purported Notice of Cancellation of Agree-
ment was effective as the appellants allege, and the 
rights of the Laytons cancelled out, why then did the 
Court recognize that the Laytons had the right of 
redemption and why did the appellants acknowledge in 
the Certificate of Redemption that the respondents here-
in were making redemption by virtue of the assign-
ments from the Laytons. 
In reading the Notice of Cancellation (Tr. 30) it 
can be soon determined that the Notice is not in the 
alternative as required by law and it can readily be 
understood why Judge Sutphen made the statement in 
his Findings: 
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"That the said Burnhams did not give the plaint-
iff in the foreclosure action or the said Christensen 
and Rosebraugh ar any of them an opportunity to 
pay the balance unpaid on the said contract of 
November 22, 1945 and did not give any of such 
persons advance notice of their intention to forfeit 
said contract and did not at any time tender to 
Christensen and Rosebraugh or the plaintiff or any 
of them a deed to the property described in said 
agreement of November 22, 1946 or any part or 
portion thereof." (Tr. 47) 
If the Notice of Cancellation was not effective as to 
Christensen and Rosebraugh, then it was not effective 
as to the Laytons, as the purported Notice was address-
ed to all of them. (Tr. 30) 
Permit us to call attention also to the Findings of 
Fact and Conclusions of Law entered in the Accounting 
Action in the District Court of the United States, for the 
District of Utah, which states: 
"Thereafter, in May 1948 (which is the month 
following the purported Notice of Cancellation), 
the parties herein negotiated the sale of the Cove 
Ranch properties, including livestock and equip-
ment situated thereon, to Carl H. Randall, Edward 
Randall and Oriel Randall, for a total purchase 
price of $140,000.00. The said Randalls entered into 
a written contract for the purchase of said "Cove 
Ranch" and personal property, from the Defendants, 
Perry E. Burnham and L. Earl Burnham, for said 
amount. Said contract was entered into by De-
fendants as trustees for the Plaintiffs, ( Laytons) 
and on their own behalf for the purpose of obtain-
ing a repayment of all moneys due and owing De-
fendants from Plaintiffs (Laytons) in connection 
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with the loans and advances made by them." (Tr. 
138) * * * "The Plaintiffs have at no time by any 
agreement with the Defendants, or otherwise, altered 
the fundamental security relationship which origin-
ally existed between the parties except that Plaintiffs 
authorized the Defendants to receive from the 
Randall Brothers $75,000.00 in notes and mortgages 
as a cash item in payment of all obligations thereto-
fore and then owing by Plaintiffs to Defendants, 
which agreement was fulfilled." 
Point 5. 
RESPONDENTS ALBERT E. REID AND LEAH 
REID, HIS WIFE, WERE RESTORED TO THE POSI-
TION OF CLIFTON B. LAYTON AT THE TIME OF 
THE EXECUTION OF HIS NOTE AND MORTGAGE. 
IN FAVOR OF ROSEBRAUGH AND CHRISTENSEN, 
WITH THE INDEBTEDNESS TO THE APPELLANTS 
PAID IN FULL AND THE SELLER UNDER THE 
CONTRACT PAID IN FULL AND THEREFORE RE-
SPONDENTS ARE ENTITLED TO THE WHOLE OF 
SAID PROPERTY AND ALL BENEFITS THEREFROM. 
The respondents Albert E. Reid and Leah Reid, his 
wife, being the assignees and grantees of Clifton B. 
Layton, Jack Layton, the assignee of Clifton B. Layton, 
and the wife of the said Jack Layton were restored to 
the position of Clifton B. Layton at the time of the execu-
tion of his note to Christensen and Rosebraugh 
and upon payment of the sum of $81,085.74 on .Sep-
tember 11, 1950 were entitled to all of the right, title, 
estate and interest of the original Sellers under the 
Agreement to sell the Cove Ranch and of course all of the 
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right, title, estate and interest of the appellants herein 
as assignees and grantees of the original sellers, which 
right included all rights to the landlord's share of the 
crops or the proceeds therefrom. It would certainly 
be an unjust enrichment of the appellants to not only 
pay them all that they received under the Agreement 
of Sale and re-imbursement for taxes, water assess-
ments, including the water assessments for the water 
used on the 1950 crop and then also allow them the 
landlord's share of the proceeds of the sale of the crops. 
Why should the respondents be charged, for instance, 
for the water assessments for the water used on the 
1950 crops if they are not to receive the benefits from 
the payment of the water assessments. 
Point 6. 
THE ACTION AS FILED WAS TO OBTAIN A 
DECLARATORY JUDGMENT AS TO THE OWNER-
SHIP OF THE ESCROWED FUNDS WITH ZION'S 
SAVINGS BANK AND TRUST COMPANY AND 
OTHER MATTERS EXTRINSIC TO THE ISSUES 
SHOULD NOT BE INTRODUCED. 
Prior to making redemption, to-wit: On September 
6, 1950 the appellants and the respondents entered into 
a contract in writing in which among other things, it 
was agreed: 
( 1) ''That of the landlord's share of the crop 
upon the land being redeemed and which has been 
raised and will be harvested as, of and during the 
crop year of 1950 and being one-third of such land-
lord's share shall be paid over to first party, the de-
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fendants herein, (Reids, the respondents) free and 
clear of all claims by second parties; the remaining 
two thirds of such landlord's share of the 1950 crop 
shall be sold as the same is harvested and the pro-
ceeds placed in escrow with the Zion's Savings Bank 
& Trust Company of Salt Lake City, Utah, thereto 
be held in escrow until declaratory judgment or 
other agreeable determination can be had as to the 
rights of first and second parties thereto." 
The original proceedings was brought for the pur-
pose of obtaining this declaratory judgment, however the 
appellants have tried through the supplemental to the 
complaint to bring in extrinsic matters which have no 
bearing whatsoever on the issue. 
Point 7. 
IF THE CASE IS CONSIDERED ONLY AS THE 
ORDINARY FORECLOSURE OF MORTGAGE, THE 
APPELLANTS WOULD BE ENTITLED ONLY TO THE 
LANDLORD'S SHARE OF THE CROP FOR THE PER-
IOD OF TIME WHILE THEY HELD THE CERTIFI-
CATE OF SALE, THAT IS FROM JUNE 9, 1950 TO 
SEPTEMBER 11, 1950, THE DATE THAT THE RE-
SPONDENTS MAI)E PAYMENT AND MADE RE-
DEMPTION OF THE PROPERTY. 
If we completely ignore the theories as set forth in 
the above and foregoing arguments and look at the 
case as the ordinary foreclosure of a mortgage and the 
rights that exist between the purchaser under the fore-
closure sale and the redemptioner, permit me to refer 
you to the following: 
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Ferguson vs. Sullivan, 74 P2nd 183. (An Idaho case) 
"A purchaser of land at execution sale on mort-
gage foreclosure must pro-rate crop or cash rental 
for entire year in which sale was made and certifi-
cate issued with judgment debtor-mortgagor on 
basis of portion of year preceding and following 
date of sale." 
The facts in the Ferguson vs. Sullivan case are as 
follows: 
"The appellant was the owner of a tract of 
farm land in Latah County, Idaho and executed a 
mortgage thereon in favor of respondent. Default 
was made in payment of the mortgage debt and fore-
closure was had, and on execution sale which oc-
cured May 26, 1936, respondent bid in the property. 
At the time of the sale, the land was in the pos-
session of and being cultivated by one Virgil Hurl-
bert, who was a lessee of the property under which 
is known as a crop lease whereby he had contracted 
to deliver to the landlord (appellant) 'one third of 
the crop delivered in the warehouse at Genessee, 
Idaho as annual rental of the place.' When the 
crop matured it was harvested by Hurlbert and 
stored in the warehouse in accordance with the 
terms of the lease, and upon demand of the pur-
chaser under the foreclosure, Hurlbert attorned 
to the defendant as landlord and delivered to him 
the entire one third of the crop. After the expira-
tion of the cropping and leasehold year, plaintiff 
made demand on defendant for the proportionate 
share of the crop rent, which was the time elapsed 
from the first of the leasehold year to the date of 
the sale bears to the entire year, on the theory 
that all earned rental to the date of the execution sale 
belonging to the plaintiff and that defendant was 
entitled to collect only rentals accruing after that 
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date. Defendant refused the demand and this ac-
tion was commenced for the collection of a propor-
tionate share of the rents which it is claimed is 
240j365 of 47,813 pounds of wheat. 
The question: Is the purchaser at execution sale 
on foreclosure entitled to receive and retain all of the 
grain or crop rental from the entire year in which 
the sale is made and the certificate is issued, or 
must he prorate with the judgment debtor for the 
portion of the year which has expired prior to the 
time of sale? 
Section 8-406 Idaho Code Annotated. 
"Until the expiration of the time allowed for re-
demption, the Court may restrain the commission of 
waste on the property, by order granted with or 
without notice, on the application of the purchaser 
or the judgment creditor. But it is not waste for 
the person in possession of the property at the time 
of sale, or entitled to possession afterwards, during 
the period allowed for redemption to continue to 
use it in the same manner in which it was previous-
ly used; or to use it in the ordinary course of hus-
bandry; or to make the necessary repairs or build-
ing thereon or to use wood or timber on the property 
therefore; or for the repair of fences; or for fuel 
in his family, while he occupies the property." 
Section 8-407 Idaho Code Annotated: 
"The purchaser from the time of the sale until 
a redemption, and a redemptioner from the time of 
his redemption until another redemption is en-
ti tied to receive, from the tenant in possession, the 
rents of the property sold or the value of the use and 
occupation thereof. But when any rents or profits 
have been received by the judgment creditor or 
purchaser, or his or their assigns, from the property 
thus sold preceding such redemption·, the amount of 
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such rents and profits shall be a credit upon the 
redemption money to be paid." 
Same as Sections 706-707 of the California Code of 
Civil Procedure, considered in the California case of 
Clarke vs. Cobb, 121 Cal. 595, 54 P. 74 Reynolds vs. 
Lathrop 7 Calif. 43, wherein the Court comments as 
follows: 
"It must be borne in mind that the whole matter 
of redemption is purely statutory, and the statute 
seems to contemplate a proportionate division of 
the rents. It was intended by this statute to give the 
purchaser at the sale the fruits of the land produced 
while he held the certificate of purchase; only this 
and nothing more. To support a construction which 
would give the purchaser at the sale (perchance, 
a purchaser for. a single day) the rents of property 
under a lease for years, for the sole reason that rents 
for the entire period happen to become due and 
payable upon that day, would seem to wander far 
from the intention of the legislature in enacting the 
statute." 
First National Bank of Yuma vs. Maxey, 34 Ariz. 
438, 272 P. 641, states that Arizona adopted the same 
statute; quoting: 
"On examining the statute carefully, it appears. 
the primary object thereof was to change the old 
rule that rent could not be apportioned and that it 
followed the legal title at the time it was due, to 
the principle that it was apportionable on the basis 
of the title at the time it was earned. That the 
legislature intended the earned rent to follow the 
complete title is shown by the remainder of the 
statute cited which provides that, in case of a re-
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demption, the purchaser accounts to the redemp-
tioner for the rents collected during the time the for-
mer held the certificate of sale. In other words, 
while the mortgagor holds both legal and equitable 
title, he is entitled to the rent earned; when he 
loses the equitable title, the earned rent goes to the 
one who has purchased it, and who presumably will 
eventually secure the legal title also. Should there 
be a redemption, however, and both legal and 
equitable title pass to someone else, that person re-
ceives the rent, dating back to the time when the 
mortgagor no longer held both titles, the rent thus 
belongs eventually to the ultimate holder of both 
the legal and equitable title, according to the time it 
was earned." 
Under Ferguson vs. Sullivan, 74 P2nd 183, the 
Court holds: 
"Under this statute the purchaser was only en-
titled to receive, the value of the use and occupa-
tion of the premises from the date of sale, May 25 
and not from the beginning of the year. For the 
same reason the original owner was entitled to the 
value for the use and occupation of the premises 
up to the time she lost the title." 
Applying the statute and the rulings in the above 
cited cases and relying upon the foreclosure only, all that 
the appellants could hope to recover would be the land-
lord's share of the crop for the period of time \vhile 
they held the certificate of sale, that is from June 9, 
1950 to September 11, 1950, the date that the defendants 
made payment and made redemption of the property. 
And we do not concede this, in view of our theory 
that the appellants as assignees of the original contract 
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were paid in full and that the respondents as assignees 
of the original purchaser were placed in the shoes of the 
original purchaser and entitled to all the rights, priv-
ileges, claims and title that the original purchaser 
bargained for. 
Point 8. 
AS A DISPUTE EXISTS BETWEEN THE PAR-
TIES AS TO TI-IE OWNERSHIP OF THE 160 ACRES 
OF LAND UPON WHICH A 1951 CROP WAS RAISED, 
AS IT INVOLVES THE QUESTION OF TI'rLE TO 
REAL, PROPERTY IN THE STATE OF IDAliO, THIS 
COURT HAS NO JURISDICTION OF THE QUESTIOl'I 
RAISED IN THE SUPPLEMENTAL TO THE COM-
PLAINT. 
As this question raises the jurisdictional question 
as to who is the owner of the 160 acres in di.spute, 
upon which a 1951 crop was raised and which is re-
ferred to by the appellants in the amendment and supp-
lement to the complaint, we are of the opinion that this 
matter can only be settled by the Idaho court where 
the property is located. There are many questions in-
valved in this dispute over the 160 acres of land, such 
as the question of a trade of 80 acres of the described 
land under the original agreement for the sale of the 
Cove Ranch for 80 acres of the disputed land; the fact 
that the other 80 acres of the disputed land was not in-
cluded under the original agreement but neverthele')s 
was always recognized as part of the Cove Ranch and 
cultivated with the balance of the 3,113.91 acres of land. 
There are also questions of the rights of the partie.; to 
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the 1951 crop in view of the fact that 80 acres of the 
disputed land was leased to one,. R. D. Hess and that 
he had possession, planted, cultivated and harvested 
the crops and received the money for the sale of the "arne; 
and that the other 80 acres was leased to N ek Stelma by 
the respondents herein with the balance of the Cove 
Ranch for the year 1951. 
CROSS APPEAL 
(1) The Court erred In awarding appellants 
$2,340.51 of the funds escrowed with Zion's Savings 
Bank and Trust Company. 
(2) The Court erred in allowing respondents 
$3,917.54 only of the funds escrowed with Zion's Savings 
Bank and Trust Company. 
ARGUMENT: 
The respondents Albert E. Reid and Leah Reid, his 
wife, on September 11, 1950 paid to the appellants the 
sum of $81,085.74 which was the amount determined by 
the District Court of Blaine County, State of Idaho, plus 
interest at 6% per annum from September 9, 1950 to 
September 11, 1950, as being the amount required for 
the redemption. 
This amount included all taxes, water assessments 
and grazing right assessments, including the water as-
sessments used in the raising of the crops for the year 
1950. 
The appellants had prior to this time received 
$75,000.00 in notes secured by mortgages as a cash item 
in full payment of all obligations therefore owing by 
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the Laytons to the appellants, therefore the money paid 
by the respondents for the redemption did not belong 
to the appellants. 
Therefore the appellants are in no way entitled to 
any portion of the escrowed funds. 
The respondents Albert E. Reid and Leah Reid, 
his wife, being the assignees of the right of redemption 
and also grantees under deeds from Clifton B. Layton, 
Jack Layton, the assignee of Clifton B. Layton, and the 
wife of the said Jack B. Layton, were restored to the 
position of Clifton B. Layton and are entitled to all of 
the right, ti1le estate and interest of the said Clifton B. 
Layton, who as purchaser· of the said Cove Ranch, had 
made full settlement with the vendors of the Cove 
Ranch and with the appellants by repayment of all 
moneys due and owing to the appellants in connection 
with the loans and advances made by them to him; which 
said right included all rights to the landlord's share 
of the crops or proceeds therefrom, the total amount 
of the escrowed funds, $6,258.05. 
WHEREFORE, respondents respectfully submit: 
That a mandate be issued from this Court ordering 
the trial court to modify the declaratory judgment by 
awarding to the respondents Albert E. Reid, and Leah 
Reid, the total amount of the escrowed funds in the sum 
of $6,258.05. 
Respectfully submitted, 
Le Grand P. Backman 
of Backman, Backman and Clark, 
Attorneys for Respondents. 
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